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FALSE LIGHT: INVASION OF PRIVACY?
I. INTRODUCTION
After nearly a century of litigation concerning the right to privacy,
the state of the law may be compared to "a haystack in a hurricane
."I Since its inception in 1890 in an article written by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,2 little progress has been made in defin-
ing and clarifying the elements of a privacy action and the interests it
seeks to protect. Yet there is little doubt that the right to privacy has
"become firmly established in our law."
3
Although the Warren and Brandeis tort was primarily concerned
with the media's unwarranted publication4 of the details of one's pri-
vate life,5 Dean Prosser has stated that the law of privacy is not one
tort, but a complex of four,6 each protecting a different interest.' One
of the torts recognized by Dean Prosser, false light, is the focus of this
comment.' Neither the elements of the tort9 nor the interests it seeks to
1. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956).
2. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
3. Nizer, The Right ofPriacy, 39 MICH. L. REv. 526, 536 (1940).
4. See notes 111-130 infra and accompanying text.
5. See Kalven, Privacy in Tort Taw-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 326, 330 (1961).
6. See generaly Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). The four torts Dean Prosser
has identified as constituting the law of privacy are:
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff.
(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
(4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.
Id. at 389.
7. In view of the fact that reputation is the interest purportedly protected by both the false
light and the public disclosure cases, there are, in fact, only three interests protected by Prosser's
four invasion of privacy torts. In addition, Prosser states that the interests protected by intrusion
and appropriation are a mental and a proprietary interest, respectively. Id. at 392, 406.
8. This comment will not individually deal with the torts of intrusion, public disclosure and
appropriation. It is not suggested that the intrusion, public disclosure and appropriation torts are
unnecessary. First, Prosser asserts that the intrusion tort permits recovery in those instances in
which intentional infliction of emotional harm, trespass, nuisance and interference with constitu-
tional rights would not provide an adequate remedy. Second, public disclosure of private facts,
while protecting a reputational interest, provides a remedy for statements not actionable under the
law of defamation in that the actionable disclosure involves a true statement. Finally, appropria-
tion protects an individual's name and likeness as an aspect of his identity. See id. at 392, 398,
406.
9. See notes 57-130 infra and accompanying text.
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protect t° have been adequately defined so as to allow consistent appli-
cation. As a result, a great deal of confusion exists with respect to the
false light tort. Furthermore, the failure to adequately define the ele-
ments and interests which this tort protects has permitted the law of
privacy to be expanded beyond its logical limits.
This comment will briefly examine the concept of, and the theory
behind, the general law of privacy. An examination of the interests
sought to be protected and the elements of a false light cause of action
will be undertaken. Following a discussion of the relationship between
defamation and privacy, two alternatives are suggested. First, a re-
structuring of the false light tort is suggested in order that it be more
closely aligned with the general law of privacy and its underlying con-
cept. In the alternative, it is suggested that the cause of action be aban-
doned due to an inherent inconsistency between the elements of a false
light cause of action and the concept of privacy.
II. TiE WARREN AND BRANDEIs TORT-THE CONCEPT OF
PRIVACY
On the basis of their article entitled "The Right to Privacy", Sa-
muel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis have been credited with "dis-
covering"" the invasion of privacy tort. The Warren and Brandeis
article resulted from a Boston newspaper's elaboration of the Warrens'
social life. The newspaper apparently made a regular practice of pub-
lishing such activities in great detail.' 2 Warren's concern with this pub-
lication of gossip and his subsequent consultation with Brandeis led to
the birth of the law of privacy.
The Warren and Brandeis article stressed the privacy of the matter
published and stated that publications which described the private life,
10. See notes 25-56 infra and accompanying text.
11. Bloustein, Privacy as anAsect ofHuman Dgni: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 962, 964 (1964). In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902), the New York Court of Appeals denied that there was a common law right to privacy. In
response to this decision the New York Legislature enacted two right of privacy statutes. N.Y.
Cwv. RJGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976). These statutes, however, deal only with Prosser's
appropriation tort and have been strictly limited thereto. See, e.g., McGraw v. Watkins, 373
N.Y.S.2d 663, 49 A.D.2d 958 (1975) (strict construction of the privacy statutes); Long v. Decca
Records, 76 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (privacy statutes enacted to prevent non-consensual
commercial exploitation); Nizer, supra note 3, at 539.
One commentator has remarked that the New York statute "merely prohibits illicit profit-
making by commercializing the identity of another," Nizer, supra note 3, at 539, adding that the
statutory recognition of the right is less preferable than the common law method because of a lack
of flexibility. Id.
12. A. MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946).
[Vol. 15:113
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habits, and relations of an individual should be repressed.13 The au-
thors contended that the individual should be permitted to determine
the extent to which her private affairs shall be communicated to the
public.14
When Warren and Brandeis formulated their tort they referred to
privacy as the right to be let alone. Included in this is protection for
"thoughts, sentiments and emotions."' 5
The design of the law must be to protect those persons with
whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from
being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity
and to protect all persons whatsoever; [sic] their position or
station from having matters which they may properly prefer
to keep private, made public against their will. It is the un-
warranted invasion of individual privacy which is repre-
hended, and to be, so far as possible, prevented. 6
The authors concluded that the interest of "inviolate personality"' 7 af-
forded very broad protection 8 to the individual against undesired pub-
licity. Warren and Brandeis stressed that the "general object in view is
to protect the privacy of private life."' 9 The concept of privacy neces-
sarily involves a person's desire to be free from unwanted inspection of
her personal affairs and her right to remain secluded and withdrawn
from notice and observation by the general public.
Thus, it can be seen that the right to privacy inheres in anyone
who has remained a private individualz" and in a public figure or offi-
cial who has not publicized her legitimately private affairs.2' It is the
individuars right to protect herself from public knowledge of, or inter-
13. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 216. Of course it should be noted that the authors
would not repress the publication of these matters if they had a legitimate connection with a
person's fitness for a public office or position she seeks, or with her ability to act in a public
capacity. Id.
14. Id. at 198. The authors wrote: "Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise
have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops.'" Id. at 195.
15. Id. at 205.
16. Id. at 214-15.
17. Id. at 205.
18. Id. at 211. It is, of course, necessary to afford the greatest possible protection to those
persons who do not wish to become public personalities. This protection, however, must be kept
within the bounds of privacy law. It should not be expanded to award redress in actions beyond
the scope of privacy law and into other areas of the law of torts. See notes 77-80 infra and accom-
panying text.
19. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 215.
20. Id. at 213.
21. Id. at 216.
19791
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ference with, her private affairs with which the law of privacy should be
concerned.
When one is dealing with the right to privacy, it is important to
keep in mind the particular interest it seeks to protect. Although used
by many courts as being descriptive of the interest protected by the law
of privacy,"2 the "right to be let alone" 23 has allowed an expansion of
the law of privacy to encompass interests not within the basic concept
of privacy.24 The right to be let alone is too broad for identifying the
interest to be protected by the law of privacy. It can be applied to en-
compass the interests protected by the general law of torts: freedom
from interference with personal comfort, safety, and health. While
general tort law is equipped to deal with and protect all such interests,
the scope of privacy law should be narrower to protect the more spe-
cific individual interest of not permitting others to pry into personal
affairs with which they have no legitimate concern, and exposing them
against an individual's will.
III. FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY
A. The Interest Protected
In order to determine the elements necessary to establish a prima
facie case involving false light,25 the interest which the tort protects
must first be examined. Prosser's false light tort recognizes reputation
as the interest to be protected. 6 Dean Prosser, in identifying the false
light tort, has departed from the Warren and Brandeis analysis. Pros-
ser's conclusions, that false light protects a reputational interest and has
a false statement as its basis, are apparently based on two premises.
First, many false light cases involve defamation claims as well.27 Sec-
22. See, e.g., Gill v Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952); Melvin v.
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291
(1942); Housh v. Peth, 99 Ohio App. 485, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d
858 (Tex. 1973).
23. T. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
24. See notes 97-109 infra and accompanying text.
25. The successful maintenance of a false light cause of action requires that the plaintiff
prove that the defendant made a false statement about her which would be offensive to a reason-
able person. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976). See also notes 57-130 infra
and accompanying text.
26. Prosser, supra, note 6, at 400. Prosser states that "[t]he interest protected is clearly that of
reputation ..... Id.
27. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C, 1948); Patton v. Royal
Indus., Inc., 263 Cal. App. 2d 760, 70 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1968); Foster Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky.
424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909); Russell v. Marboro Box Co., 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct.
[Vol. IS: 113
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ond, very often an action for either can be successfully maintained on
the same factual allegations.28 Neither of these, however, is a sufficient
basis upon which to conclude that the false light privacy tort protects a
reputational interest.
As a result of the inconsistency between Prosser's identification of
the interest to be protected and the concept and theory of privacy,29
there has been confusion in the courts. In addressing this question the
courts have identified a number of interests that are purportedly pro-
tected by false light. Among those recognized are the following: free-
dom from scorn and ridicule;3" freedom from personal outrage;31
freedom from the "unwarranted publication by the defendant of inti-
mate details of the plaintiff's private life;' 32 the "individual's absolute
dominion and control over his inviolate personality; ' 33 freedom from
injury to feelings;34 freedom from mental anguish;35 the individual's
peace of mind;36 freedom from shame, humiliation and harassment;37
the right to seclusion;38 the right to choose the time, place and manner
in and at which she will submit herself to the public gaze;39 freedom
from contempt and disgrace;4° and, of course, the right to be let alone.41
Many of the interests identified by the courts are also protected by the
law of defamation.42
1959); Martin v. Johnson Publishing Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Bennett v. Norban,
396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
28. Prosser, supra note 6, at 400.
29. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
30. Martin v. Johnson Publishing Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
31. Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
32. Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, -, 325 P.2d 659, 660 (1958).
33. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, _, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1964), aff'd,
23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 221
N.E.2d 543 (1966).
34. Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
35. Id.
36. Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (1958); Fairfield v.
American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955).
37. Berrier v. Beneficial Fin., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ind. 1964).
38. Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965).
39. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 198, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
40. Trammel v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
41. See, e.g., Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952); Melvin v.
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944);
Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa.
86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
42. Defamation cases recognizing various protected interests include the following: Jones v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 459 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1972) (mental suffering); Hogan v. New York Times
Co., 211 F. Supp. 99 (D. Conn. 1962) (shame and disgrace); Fuqua Television Co. v. Fleming, 134
Ga. App. 731, 215 S.E.2d 694 (1975) (hurt feelings); Martin v. Griffin Television, 549 P.2d 85
5
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Professor Bloustein 3 has added yet another interpretation of the
interest sought to be protected by the law of privacy. Professor Blou-
stein's focus is on the entire law of privacy, rather than a false light
cause of action, because he disagrees with Prosser's separation of the
law into four torts.' He has interpreted Warren and Brandeis' phrase
"inviolate personality" as giving protection to the individual's indepen-
dence and integrity.45 He argues that the overall interest deserving of
protection is that of human dignity,46 thus making invasion of privacy
a tort protecting essentially a mental interest.47
Bloustein has recognized that the false light cases do protect, to a
limited degree, a reputational interest.48  Yet he properly maintains
that the right protected by privacy law is "not the same as the right to
reputation. '49 Thus, Bloustein has correctly restricted the scope of pri-
vacy law to its conceptual and definitional basis.50 The right to live a
life free from unnecessary inspection of personal affairs is the right pro-
tected by the law of privacy. There is then, the individual's right to be
free from the "debasement of his sense of himself as a person that re-
sults because his life has become a public spectacle against his will.' '
The corresponding compensation is for mental anguish and mortifica-
tion. Thus, in light of the fact that an interference with an individual's
privacy is a dignitary tort, the right to privacy concerns a person's
peace of mind.52 The injury is, therefore, essentially mental and sub-
jective53 and recovery should be allowed only on the basis of personal
outrage54 and mental anguish.55
(Okla. 1976) (humiliation); Guisto v. Galveston Tribune, 105 Tex. 497, 150 S.W. 874 (1912) (con-
tempt); Enterprise Co. v. Ellis, 98 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (ridicule).
43. Bloustein, supra note 11. The author points out that the law of privacy protects a single
interest and would not identify individual interests to be protected by four different torts. Id. at
1000.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 971.
46. Id. at 974.
47. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law and/he Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and
Unconstitutional as Wel, 46 TEx. L. REy. 611, 618 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bloustein, Pri.
vacy].
48. Bloustein, supra note 11, at 991.
49. Id. at 970.
50. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
51. Bloustein, Privacy, supra note 47, at 619. Warren and Brandeis wrote of protecting a
person from mental pain and distress. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
52. See, e.g., Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (1958);
Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955).
53. See, e.g., Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (1958);
Billings v. Atkinson, 589 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
54. Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
[Vol. 15:113
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Thus, it appears that the conflict between the interests allegedly
protected by the false light tort is a result of Dean Prosser's identifica-
tion of a reputation interest in cases involving false light invasion of
privacy. Protection of a reputation interest is inconsistent with the con-
cept of privacy. Privacy law is designed to protect an individual's
mental tranquility. The concept of privacy law should not permit an
award of damages for injury to a person's reputation.56
B. The Elements of False Light-Invasion of Privacy
Prosser maintains, and the courts have accepted, that the false
light cause of action requires that three elements be proved. These ele-
ments are (1) publication (2) of a false statement concerning the plain-
tiff (3) that would be offensive to a reasonable person. 7 Gloss has been
added to these elements through the requirements that the statement be
materially false, that the statement sufficiently identify the plaintiff to
the general public, and that the false statement would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person.
55. Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, _, 162 P.2d 133, 139 (1945). It is
interesting to note that the court felt compelled to justify the allowance of damages on the basis of
mental suffering alone. The court stated: "It seems clear to us that the mind of an individual, his
feelings and mental processes, are as much a part of his person as his observable physical mem-
bers." Id. at _, 162 P.2d at 139. The court's reaction was probably in response to the general
principle that "our law recognizes no principle upon which compensation can be granted for mere
injury to the feelings." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 197.
56. The purpose of a defamation cause of action is to protect an individual's reputation. See
generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971).
The purposes of the laws of defamation and privacy are different. The judiciary should be
careful to ensure that the interests protected by the two areas of the law are fully distinguished.
Invasion of privacy and defamation are separate and distinct torts even though they
share some of the same elements and often arise out of the same acts. The first is a cause
of action based upon injury to plaintiff's emotions and his mental suffering; the second is
a remedy for injury to plaintiff's reputation.
Froelich v. Adair, 516P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973). The courts must take care to ensure that the
bases of the causes of action are sufficiently distinguished so as to permit damage awards in pri-
vacy cases strictly on the basis of redress for mental suffering that results from the defendant's
interference with the individual's right to be free from unwanted disturbance of her personal af-
fairs.
57. Prosser, supra note 6, at 398-401. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has basically fol-
lowed the Prosser formulation and has stated the tort as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
7
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1. Offensiveness
a. Heightened Offensiveness and Falsity
It is agreed that a false statement is necessary for the successful
maintenance of a false light cause of action. 8 While this creates an
apparent overlap between a false light cause of action and a defama-
tion cause of action,59 there remains a distinction. In false light, the
degree of falsity required of the statement is heightened by the fact that
the statement must be substantially or materially false.6
The "materiality" test may be a method of assuring that the state-
ment would be offensive to a reasonable person. Requiring that the
statement be "materially" false increases the probability that the state-
ment was objectively offensive and that an injury has occurred. This
gradation of falsity serves the purpose of aiding the jury in assessing
damages because, as the degree of material falsity increases, there is a
greater likelihood that the statement was made with malice.61 Publica-
tions that include additions or embellishments that are not of a signifi-
cant nature would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person.62
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has approached the standard of
offensiveness differently. It states that liability for false light occurs
58. See, e.g., Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652E (1976); Prosser, supra note 6, at 407.
59. See, e.g., Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1970); Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., 161 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381
F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946); Mat-
thews v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 337, 157 S.E.2d 300 (1967); Bloomfield v. Retail
Credit Co., 14 IM. App. 3d 158, 302 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
60. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Cordell v. Detective Publications Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
61. This malice is not to be confused with the definition of "actual malice" as laid down in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,
419 U.S. 245 (1974), the Court drew the distinction between the standards of actual and common
law malice. Common law malice is "frequently expressed in terms of either personal ill-will to-
wards the plaintiff or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights [and focuses] on the
defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff's privacy, not on the truth or falsity of the matter pub-
lished." Id. at 252. Punitive damages cannot be awarded unless it has been determined that a
wrongful state of mind, common law malice, existed in the defendant. See Brown v. Capricorn
Records, Inc., 136 Ga. 818, 222 S.E.2d 618 (1975).
62. See Cordell v. Detective Publications Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), where
embellishments could not be offensive to a reasonable person because they were consistent with
published newspaper accounts of the event. Dean Prosser also states that minor errors do not
entitle the subject of the publication to recover. Prosser, supra note 6, at 400. Furthermore, even
if the statement is made deliberately, it is not actionable under a false light theory unless it is
material and substantial. Winegard v. Larson, 260 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Iowa 1978). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, Comment c (1976), which states that the plaintiff's pri-
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only "when the defendant knows that the plaintiff, as a reasonable
man, would be justified in the eyes of the community in feeling seri-
ously offended and aggrieved by the publicity."63 It is arguable that
every personal false statement, regardless of how inconsequential,
could be, to some degree, offensive to the subject of the statement. It is
for this reason that the Restatement (Second) has added the require-
ment that the statement must be "highly offensive."'
Thus, it appears that the purpose of both the "materiality" test and
the "highly offensive" test used by the Restatement is to ensure that the
false statement would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
not only the hypersensitive individual, so as to result in mental suffer-
ing.65
b. Heightened Offensiveness and Trivial Claims
The heightened degree of offensiveness may be responsive to a
fear that a floodgate could be opened to litigation in this area. One
commentator has pointed out that trivial claims 66 may arise under the
tort.67 Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co.68 is an exam-
ple of such a claim. In Themo the claim arose out of the taking of the
plaintiff's picture while he was conversing with a police officer. The
defendant subsequently published the photograph in its newspaper.
The facts surrounding the incident were not stated in the publication.69
It is clear that nothing personal or private to the plaintiff was publi-
63. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652E, Comment c (1976). Compare the statement
of liability in the first Restatement: "[Lliability exists only if the defendants conduct was such that
he should have realized that it would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities." RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 867, Comment d (1933). See also Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d
974 (3d Cir. 1951).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976). The requirement of heightened offen-
siveness is in response to the general proposition that redress is not granted for mere injury to
feelings. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 197.
65. See notes 25-56 supra and accompanying text.
66. Kalven, supra note 5, at 337. Professor Kalven offers three cases as being exemplary of
trivial claims. Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 655, 211 P.2d 320 (1949), where a former boxer
sued Groucho Marx for publicly saying, "I once managed a fighter named Canvasback Cohen. I
brought him out here, he got knocked out, and I made him walk back to Cleveland.' Id. at .
211 P.2d at 321. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944), where the defendant's book
identified the plaintiff as a spinster having a propensity toward profanity. Id. at , 20 So. 2d at
245. Sidis v. F.R. Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), where a child prodigy, then leading
his adult life in seclusion, was made the subject of a "Where Are They Now?" article. Id. at 808.
67. But see Bloustein, Privacy, supra note 47, at 614-15, where the author argues that the
reasonableness standard is not the cause of trivial claims.
68. 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940).
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cized.70 The plaintiff was not placed in a false light because the photo-
graph did not communicate anything other than what had actually
occurred, namely the conversation.71 The claim was trivial because the
plaintiff sought to recover for the depiction of an incident that took
place on a public street and which did not represent the plaintiff in a
false manner.
Further illustration of the triviality of the claim can be seen
through the court's treatment of the plaintiff's claim in relation to the
general law of privacy. The court said that under these circumstances
the plaintiff had no privacy interest.72 Furthermore, the public nature
of the incident prevented the plaintiff from proving that the defendant
had neither the right to take the photograph nor the right to reproduce
and publish it. It appears, therefore, that the plaintiff did not have a
legally enforceable73 right to privacy under the circumstances of the
case.
The principle recognized in Themo is applicable to trivial claims
brought under a false light theory of recovery. Plaintiffs who are not
depicted falsely through some action on the defendant's part, should
not be permitted to recover damages in a false light cause of action. A
material element of the tort, falsity, is missing and recovery should be
denied.
c. Heightened Offensiveness and Laudatory Statements
Use of the heightened degree of offensiveness is not without diffi-
culties. Problems arise when false, but laudatory, statements are made
about the plaintiff. In Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.,74 statements about
the plaintiff, Spahn, were false but complimentary. While Spahn's
cause of action was brought under the narrowly construed New York
privacy statutes, 75 in their absence Spahn's claim would turn into a
70. See notes 110-130 infra and accompanying text.
71. In addition to not being a false light case, Themo falls into none of the other privacy torts.
There was no public disclosure in that no "private" facts were involved. Similarly, no intrusion
was involved. There was no appropriation because the photograph was not published for the
defendant's pecuniary advantage. The photograph merely published what anyone present at the
time was free to see.
72. 306 Mass. at_, 27 N.E.2d at 755. The court stated that if individuals could prohibit such
a publication, "no newspaper could lawfully publish a photograph of a parade or street scene."
Id. at ., 27 N.E.2d at 755.
73. The court noted that the case did not, under its facts, present occasion to decide "whether
any right of privacy [was] recognized by the law of [Massachusetts]." Id.
74. 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260
N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 844, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966).
75. N.Y. Cmy. RIGcrrs LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976). See also note 11 supra.
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false light cause of action. Under the analyses of both Dean Prosser
and the Restatement, it seems that Spahn, under a false light theory,
would have been permitted to recover for any damage to his reputa-
tion. Recovery would have been allowed even though the statement
may not have been defamatory.76 Yet this is precisely the type of case 77
in which recovery should not be permitted under a false light theory. It
must be questioned whether complimentary and laudatory statements
inflict the degree of mental anguish that should be required 78 in order
to allow recovery. Assuming that every false statement about a person
is likely to arouse some feeling of animosity in the person who is the
subject of the statement, it is unlikely that these complimentary false-
hoods would justify a reasonable person in feeling "seriously offended
and aggrieved by the publicity."79
The offensiveness standard is an objective one and although plain-
tiffs such as Mr. Spahn may, in fact, have been seriously offended by
the false, but complimentary publicity, the object of the law is to pro-
tect the average person of ordinary sensibilities8" in the community, not
the hypersensitive individual.8 ' Offensiveness is generally a factual de-
termination and not a question of law.82 In cases of complimentary
falsehoods, however, treatment of the offensiveness standard as a mat-
ter of law would seem to be more appropriate. Such a ruling would
require that the court determine the statement's degree of offensive-
ness.8 3 In making this determination, the court should keep in mind
that the statement was not derogatory of the plaintiff. Such a ruling
would bar recovery when laudatory falsehoods are involved in that the
statement would not meet, as a matter of law, the requirement of
heightened offensiveness under either Time, Inc. v. Hill84 or the Re-
statement formulation.85
This is essentially what the court did in Cordell v. Detective Publi-
76. Prosser, supra note 6, at 400.
77. See also Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944), where the plaintiff was
favorably portrayed as a fine and attractive personality except for a trait of profanity. Id. at_, 20
So. 2d at 247. It should be noted that the Florida Supreme Court decided this case sixteen years
before the publication of Dean Prosser's article analyzing the law of privacy.
78. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, Comment c (1976).
80. See Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
81. See Reed v. Ponton, 15 Mich. App. 423, , 166 N.W.2d 629, 630 (1968).
82. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 73, _, 239 P.2d 630, 635 (1952).
83. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
84. 385 U.S. 374, 386 (1967).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
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cations, Inc..6 Cordell involved the publication of an article concern-
ing the plaintiff's murdered daughter and the events leading up to the
capture of the suspects.8 7 The court examined the publication and
found that it contained additions and embellishments. 88 The court de-
termined, however, that nothing in the article "could reasonably be in-
terpreted as casting the plaintiff, Mrs. Cordell, in public disrepute, nor
could they reasonably be offensive or objectionable to a person of ordi-
nary sensibilities ... *89 It appears, therefore, that false statements
which are laudatory should, as a matter of law, be determined not
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Such
statements, as a result, should not be actionable under a false light the-
ory of recovery.
2. The Requirement of a False Statement
Although the false light tort has evolved to require the publication
of a false statement, Warren and Brandeis based their tort on "injury to
the right of privacy"90 and not on the falsehood of the matters pub-
lished. Courts have followed the basic goal of protecting privacy by
stating that "the gravamen of the tort is ordinarily the unwarranted
publication by defendant of intimate details of plaintiff's private
life."91 Hence, "recovery for invasion of a right of privacy is only
available when the plaintiff's private affairs have been given unautho-
rized exposure." 92
In Patton v. Royal Industries, Inc. 93 the court held that even
86. 307 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
87. For a discussion of the "newsworthiness" standard relating to the constitutional privilege
in privacy cases see Comment, Privacy: The Search For a Standard, II WAKE FOREST L. REV.
659 (1975).
88. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
89. 307 F. Supp. at 1219. Note that the court held the statement to be neither offensive nor
damaging to reputation. Id.
90. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 218.
91. Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, _, 325 P.2d 659, 661 (1958). See
also Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. La. 1962); Patton v.
Royal Indus., Inc., 263 Cal. App. 2d 718, 70 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1968); Pavesich v. New England Life,
122 Ga. 198, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Reed v. Ponton, 15 Mich. App.. 423, 166 N.W.2d 629 (1968);
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 23 App.
Div. 2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 844, 221 N.E.2d 543
(1966).
92. Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 251, 253 (W.D. La. 1962) (em-
phasis in original).
93. 263 Cal. App. 2d 760, 70 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1968). The case involved the defendant em-
ployer's letter to its customers that the plaintiffs were no longer in the defendant's employ intimat-
ing that the plaintiffs were incompetent. In fact, the plaintiffs voluntarily left the defendant's
employ for the purpose of starting their own business. Id. at . 70 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
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though the plaintiffs were placed in a false light their privacy had not
been invaded. The court stated that "[tihere is and could be no author-
ity for the broad contention that publicity which places one in a false
light is an invasion of his privacy, even though it discloses no fact
whatever relative to his private life which he wishes to keep secret." 94
While the Patton case may be inconsistent with the false light cause of
action as it stands, it is not inconsistent with the concept of privacy
law.95 The court correctly held that an invasion of privacy claim can-
not be successful in the absence of some public interference with the
plaintiff's private affairs. Despite what would seem to be a fairly logi-
cal proposition, it is apparently unclear that a publicized falsehood
cannot be a private matter.96
In Rinsley v. Brandt97 the court took issue with the Patton court's
view on what the requirements were for a successful false light invasion
of privacy claim. The Rinsley court stated that a "false light privacy
claim does not require the invasion of something secret to the plain-
tiff . . .The key to a false light privacy claim is the falsehood, not
any element of secrecy."98 The Restatement also takes the position that
a false light cause of action "does not depend upon making public any
facts concerning the private life of the individual." 99 These statements
remove from a false light claim any element of privacy or secrecy.1°°
The removal of the privacy element from the false light claim results in
the cause of action resting entirely on the falsity of the publication.
Such an analysis is inconsistent with both the concept of privacy 01 and
the cases requiring that there be publicity or exposure of something
personal or private to the plaintiff.102
There is a logical inconsistency between requiring on the one hand
that a matter be private and, on the other, that it be false. An escape
from this inconsistency should not be available by simply eliminating
the "privacy" element from false light claims as has been done by both
the Rinsley court and the drafters of the Restatement. Prosser states
94. Id. at _, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 48. The case was remanded for a determination of the plain-
tiff's libel cause of action.
95. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 107-108 infra and accompanying text.
97. 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977).
98. Id. at 854.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, Comment a (1976).
100. Prosser's torts of intrusion and public disclosure require that the matter intruded into or
disclosed must be private and be entitled to be private. Prosser, supra note 6, at 391, 394.
101. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 90-96 supra and accompanying text.
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that his public disclosure tort requires that the publicized matter be
private. 0 3 This requirement should be present in all privacy cases.
What the law should primarily seek to protect is an individual's right to
be free from unwarranted interference with her personal affairs.1t 4
Furthermore, it should be required that the plaintiff intend to keep her
private affairs insulated from public scrutiny.105
The Restatement formulation and the Rinsley case point to the il-
logic of making a privacy claim contingent upon the falsity of the state-
ment. This illogic arises from the fact that the person referred to in the
statement cannot intend 0 6 to keep private a matter which, in her own
mind, does not exist. If the statement is false, then the person about
whom it is made would have no reason to be aware of its subject mat-
ter. It must be questioned, therefore, how that individual can desire to
keep the subject matter of the publication a private matter. 0 7 Inas-
much as a false light cause of action does not involve a matter which
the plaintiff prefers to keep secret, the individual's interests in remain-
ing withdrawn from the public gaze and in preserving her mental tran-
quility are not protected. When the law of privacy protects interests
other than these, as is done in the case of the false light tort, it has
moved outside its logical limits. It can be seen, therefore, that the false
light cause of action fails to give proper protection to an individual's
privacy interests.
If the false light tort protects a reputational interest, then the inter-
ests protected by the laws of defamation and false light privacy would
be identical. The law of privacy should not be used as a substitute
remedy when known and established remedies are available. 0 8 This is
not to say that tort law should not expand to meet the changing needs
of society.'0 9 What it is to say, however, is that an individual's interest
in her good reputation is adequately protected by the law of defama-
tion.
If, in fact, the interests protected by the two areas of the law are
103. Prosser, supra note 6, at 393. Although the false light and public disclosure torts purport-
edly protect the same interest, the subject matter of a public disclosure cause of action is required
to be a private matter. See id. at 394.
104. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
105. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214-15. Thus, individuals who voluntarily disclose
their private affairs or impliedly consent to public scrutiny thereof would not intend to keep their
affairs restricted from public inspection.
106. Id. at 215. The authors were concerned with publications against the will of the plaintiff.
107. Id. at 214.
108. Gregory v. Bryant-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, . 174 S.W.2d 510, 512 (1943).
109. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 3-4 (4th ed. 1971).
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identical, the false light remedy merely duplicates that available in a
successful defamation action. The interest that should be protected by
the law of false light privacy is the plaintiff's mental tranquility and
not her good reputation. The courts should take care to fully separate
defamation and false light causes of action so as not to award redress in
a false light cause of action for damage to an individuars reputation.
3. Publication of a Statement About the Plaintiff
The successful maintenance of a false light cause of action requires
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant publicized a false statement. It
is generally required that there be sufficient identification of the plain-
tiff to the general public in order to impose liability.
The right to be free from being placed in a false light is a personal
oneo and is peculiar to the individual about whom the statement is
made."'I No recovery, therefore, is available to anyone other than the
person who is placed in the false light."I2 It is not required, however,
that the plaintiff be directly identified by the statement. The public' 13
need only be familiar with the name, likeness, or other characteristic
which would identify the plaintiff. 14
Meeropol v. Nizer' 'I is illustrative of the publication requirement
in a false light privacy claim. In Meeropol, the plaintiffs were the chil-
dren of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg" 6 and the publication in question
referred to them by that name. The name "Meeropol," by which the
plaintiffs had been known for more than twenty years, was not used in
the publication. The court held that recovery was unavailable because
insufficient identification of the plaintiffs did not apprise the public that
the Meeropols were the subjects of the publication. Meeropol makes
110. Prosser, supra note 6, at 408.
111. See, e.g., Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965) (the right to
privacy does not survive the death of a person); Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d
718, 325 P.2d 659 (1958) (cause of action does not survive the death of a person).
112. Requiring that recovery be limited to the subject of the statement may be viewed as a
method of preventing recovery on trivial claims. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 117-121 infra and accompanying text.
114. See Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966). It is generally
required that there be a sufficient reference to the plaintiff. This terminology should be under-
stood to mean identification which is as much as is necessary for the public to recognize the
plaintiff as the subject of the publication. Brittain v. Industrial Comm'n, 95 Ohio St. 391, _, 115
N.E. 110, 111 (1917).
115. 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af'd in part rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
116. The Rosenbergs were executed for conspiring to transmit to the Soviet Union informa-
tion relating to national security. See L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY (1973).
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clear that unless there is a sufficient reference 1 7 to the plaintiff by
which she can be identified, there is no invasion of privacy.'" 8
In addition to the requirement that the plaintiff be sufficiently
identified, there must also be general identification to the public as a
whole. It is generally held that publication to a small group of peo-
ple'I ' or close friends is not sufficient.12 The publication must identify
its subject to the public in general before there can be recovery for false
light invasion of privacy.121
Application of this broad publication requirement does not ade-
quately protect the plaintiff's mental interest, 22 the very interest to be
protected by a false light privacy claim. As stated earlier, the law
should focus upon emotional suffering rather than upon the plaintiff's
appearance in the eyes of the community. 123 In order to fully protect
the interests protected by the law of privacy and to be consistent with
the theory and concept of privacy, 24 compensation should be granted
to the plaintiff whose "privacy" has been disturbed and for the mental
anguish occasioned by that disturbance. An individual may suffer an
equal degree of mental anguish if only one person learns of the false-
hood or if the entire community learns of it. This being the case, reten-
tion of the false light cause of action 25 dictates that the broad
publication requirement be changed so as to better protect the plaintiff.
Such a change in the publication requirement was accomplished in
Beaumont v. Brown. 26 In Beaumont, the Supreme Court of Michigan
set forth a more equitable publication standard that better serves to
protect a plaintiff's mental interest. The Beaumont court found com-
munication to the general public to be an ambiguous term. To more
117. See note 114 supra. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the book
could not have invaded the Meeropols' privacy. The court stated that "the book could not have
.. . invaded their privacy since the book never referred to them by the Meeropol name or in any
way linked the Rosenbergs to the Meeropols." Id. at 1068. The court reversed the case with re-
spect to the fair use defense. The court held that it was "error to uphold the fair use defense as a
matter of law as to all defendants." Id. at 1071.
118. See Bayer v. Ralston Purina Co., 484 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1972).
119. Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974).
120. Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, ., 217 N.E.2d 736, 740 (1966).
121. See, e.g., Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Brauer v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966); Beaumont v. Brown, 65 Mich. App.
455,237 N.W. 2d 501 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 401 Mich. 80,257 N.W.2d 522 (1977); Reed v.
Ponton, 15 Mich. App. 423, 166 N.W.2d 629 (1968).
122. See notes 126-130 infra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 25-56 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 174-183 infra and accompanying text.
126. 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977).
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clearly define that term, it developed a "particular public" 27 standard
which takes into account the status of the individual whose privacy has
been disturbed. The court stated:
[C]ommunication of embarrassing facts about an individual
to a public not concerned with that individual and with whom
the individual is not concerned obviously is not a "serious in-
terference" with the plaintiff's right to privacy, although it
might be unnecessary or unreasonable. An invasion of a
plaintiff's right to privacy is important if it exposes private
facts to a public whose knowledge of these facts would be em-
barrassing to the plaintiff. 2
Although the publication standard would be set on a case by case ba-
sis, 12 9 there would be sufficient guidance to trial courts and attorneys as
to the extent of publication necessary to hold the defendant liable.
Affording sufficient protection to the plaintiff's mental tranquility
may be dependent upon application of the publication requirement. It
may be that in certain cases the "particular public" might be comprised
of only one person. Put another way, the "particular public" might be
viewed as that group of people who, if falsely informed about some
aspect of the plaintiff's private life, would, by their knowledge, justifia-
bly cause the plaintiff to feel seriously aggrieved and offended.
Thus, it appears that the "particular public" standard is, in light of
the interests to be protected, more appropriate than the presently ac-
cepted standard of widespread publication to the general public.
Under the "particular public" standard the plaintiff's burden of proof
is less exacting. She would be required to prove what persons com-
prised the relevant "particular public" and that the publication, in fact,
reached those persons. This permits a plaintiff who has not received
general notoriety from a publication to recover for her mental suffering
which resulted from a false message being conveyed to and believed by
a group of acquaintances, associates, or friends. The "particular pub-
lic" standard provides relief for the greatest number of deserving plain-
tiffs. In addition, the "particular public" standard is flexible enough to
award greater damages in the event of widespread publication of an
outrageous falsehood. In such an instance a reasonable person is likely
to experience greater mental suffering as a result of such a publication.
127. Id. at_ 257 N.W.2d at 531.
128. Id. at 257 N.W.2d at 531.
129. Beaumont v. Brown, 65 Mich. App. 455, 237 N.W.2d 501 (1975), rev'don other grounds,
401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977).
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As well as adequately protecting an individual's mental interest,
the "particular public" standard maintains a proper distinction be-
tween the publication which should be required in a privacy action and
that which is required in a defamation action. The broad, presently
existing, publication requirement is not necessary for the protection of
the plaintiff's mental interest. The "particular public" standard is suf-
ficiently stringent so as to allow recovery only in those cases in which a
reasonable plaintiff would be justified in feeling highly offended or ag-
grieved by the publicity. 130
IV. THE ALTERNATIVES
The failure to adequately define the elements of false light privacy
and the interests it seeks to protect, has left the law in a state of confu-
sion. This confusion requires that the law of false light privacy either
be restructured so as to protect a plaintiff's mental interest l3 or be
abandoned because of an inherent inconsistency between the concept
of privacy and the requirement of a false statement.'32
Before these alternatives can be examined, however, it is necessary
to examine some general similarities and differences between the laws
of defamation and false light privacy.
A. General Similiarities and Differences Between the Laws of
Defamation and False Light Privacy
The requiring of a false statement, 33 the granting of recovery for
damage to reputation, 34 and the absence of requiring that the pub-
lished matter be secret, 35 indicate that there, is an overlap between the
laws of privacy and defamation. 36 The confusion caused by this over-
lap can be traced to the origins of the invasion of privacy tort in that
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
131. See notes 174-183 infra and accompanying text.
132. See note 184 infra and accompanying text.
133. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
134. Prosser, supra note 6, at 400.
135. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652E, Comment a (1976); Prosser, supra note 6, at 400.
136. Prosser, supra note 6, at 408; Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 1093 (1962). In Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wash. 253, 396 P.2d 793 (1964), the court stated:
A problem arises, however, from the fact that for either defamation or invasion of pri-
vacy the damages recoverable are not limited to the theoretical bases of the respective
torts. In defamation actions the injured party is allowed to recover for emotional distress
as well as injury to reputation and vice versa in some actions for invasion of privacy.
Id. at ., 396 P.2d at 796-97 (citations omitted).
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Warren and Brandeis analogized their tort to the law of defamation
and applied its standards to the law of privacy. 3 7 There is little doubt
that because of the strong similarity between false light and defamation
cases the courts have consistently treated the two claims in essentially
the same manner. 3 8 This similarity became greater when, in Rinsley v.
Brandt,13 9 the court held that the key to a false light cause of action is
the falsity of the statement and not any element of secrecy.' 40 This
overlap has been taken to its extreme by Dean Wade who has written
that "the action for invasion of the right of privacy may come to sup-
plant the action for defamation." 141
The greatest similarities between defamation and false light are,
therefore, the requirements that a false statement be made and that the
interest purportedly protected by each is reputation.
There has not, however, been a complete extension of defamation
principles into the law of false light privacy.'42 Although defamation
137. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214-15.
138. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 854. See also notes 97-108 supra and accompanying text.
141. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1962). Dean
Prosser had earlier noted the possibility that false light might be "capable of swallowing up and
engulfing the whole law of public defamation." Prosser, supra note 6, at 401. Yet Prosser was
more reluctant to accept this chain of events than was Wade. Prosser expressed concern over the
scope of the false light cause of action and asked if the "numerous restrictions and limitations
which have hedged defamation about for many years, in the interest of freedom of the press and
the discouragement of trivial and extortionate claims. . .[are of] so little consequence that they
may be circumvented in so casual and cavalier a fashion?" Id.
142. The requirement of a false statement indicates one area in which the overlap between
defamation and false light privacy has not been total. This area relates to the operation of truth as
a defense. Warren and Brandeis maintained that the truth of the matter should afford no defense
to an action for invasion of privacy. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 218. Dean Prosser has
since recognized, however, that truth has limited importance as a defense when a false light claim
is asserted. Prosser, supra note 6, at 419. Yet despite this recognition by the founder of the false
light tort, courts have consistently held that while truth is a defense to an action for libel or slan-
der, it is no defense to an action for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., McKinzie v. Huckaby, 112 F.
Supp. 642 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Themo v. New
England Newspaper Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 736 (1940); Belle v. Courier-Journal & Louis-
ville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1966).
Judicial rejection of the truth defense to a false light cause of action is, in relation to the
elements of the tort, illogical. In that the action is based on the falsity of the statement then truth,
as a matter of simple logic, must afford a complete defense. If the defendant is able to prove that
the statement is, in fact, true, then that proof negates the essential element upon which the cause
of action is based. Truth, therefore, necessarily defeats the plaintiff's claim. In Brown v. Capri-
corn Records, Inc., 136 Ga. 818, 222 S.E.2d 618 (1975), the court reached essentially this result
although it did not directly address itself to the effect of the truth defense. In Brown, the plaintiff
alleged that, as a result of his picture being used on a record album cover, he had been placed in a
false light. The court, however, refused to grant relief because the plaintiff was a street singer and
often sang in front of the liquor store at which he was depicted. The use of the picture described
the plaintiff as neither something he was not nor in a manner in which he did not often appear.
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cases may prove helpful in determining liability in privacy cases, t41
defamation standards should not be absolutely controlling in privacy
cases. One apparent difference, discussed previously, 144 is the extent of
publication required for liability under the two torts. In false light the
publication requirements are more exacting in that the plaintiff must
show that the false statement was broadcast to the public in general. 14
A second similarity between the laws of false light privacy and
defamation arises from the fact that the right to privacy deserves full
protection as a right of natural law and derivative of the United States
Constitution as well.' 46
It is clear that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 47 standard of
"actual malice"'148 applies to privacy cases. 49  Yet, it is not clear
whether the constitutional privilege applies to the status of the person
as a public official 150 or a public figure' 51 or whether it applies to the
Id. at _.._, 222 S.E.2d at 619. The fact that the picture conveyed a message, or depicted a scene,
which was, in fact, true, afforded the defendant with a complete defense. If, therefore, a statement
made and published by the defendant is true, then the basis of the false light cause of action is
destroyed and no false light recovery is justified.
Of course, the preceding discussion must be read in the context of the possible alternatives
that can be pursued in the courts. If the false light cause of action is retained, then the truth
defense must be permitted because proof by the defendant that the statement was true would
negate a material element of the tort, that is, falsity. If the extreme alternative of abandonment of
the tort is pursued, then the defense is totally inapplicable because the courts would be holding
that a false statement cannot, as a matter of law, be an invasion of privacy.
143. Wade, Defamation and the Right ofPrivacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1120 (1962).
144. See notes 110-130 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 110-125 supra and accompanying text. Assume for the moment, however, that
the false light tort should protect the plaintiff's reputation, as Prosser contends. If this be the case
then the right to maintain a good reputation becomes more readily actionable under the publica-
tion requirement of defamation. In terms of the extent of publication, the plaintiff's reputation
should not be required to be more greatly harmed in privacy than in defamation before recovery
will be permitted. If, in fact, the interest protected by the two torts is the same, then that interest
should receive equal protection under both torts.
146. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 198, _ 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905). It should
be noted, however, that the "constitutional right of privacy is not to be equated with the common
law right recognized by state tort law." McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76 (8th
Cir. 1976). The doctrine of constitutional privacy is a limited one and "the federal courts have
generally rejected efforts by plaintiffs to constitutionalize tortious invasions of privacy involving
less than the most intimate aspects of human affairs." Id. at 76-77.
147. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
148. "Actual malice" is defined as a statement made "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80.
149. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967). The specific holding with regard to the
Time case was as follows:
We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application
of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the ab-
sence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth.
Id.
150. "mT1he 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy
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newsworthiness of the event.152 In Time, Inc. v. Hill'53 the Court held
that the Times standard applied to matters of public interest in privacy
cases154 rather than to public officials and public figures. 155 This appli-
cation of the Times standard to the event as opposed to the status of the
person, has left a gap in the overlap between false light privacy and
defamation. It has been argued that the constitutional privilege in rela-
tion to privacy cases should be different from that found in the law of
defamation. 5 6 This question remains open because the United States
of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for
or control over the conduct of government affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
It has also been stated that "a person may be deemed a public official where he is fulfilling
duties which are public in nature, 'involving in their performance the exercise of some portion of
the sovereign power, whether great or small."' Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation &
Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, _ 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (1976).
151. The Supreme Court has identified two ways in which a person may become a public
figure for purposes of the constitutional privilege.
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of special prominence
in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classified as
public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolutions of the issues involved.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
152. See Comment, Privacy: The Search For A Standard, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 659
(1975).
153. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Time the plaintiff brought a cause of action under the New York
right to privacy statute.
154. 385 U.S. at 388. The Supreme Court's extension of the defamation privilege to matters of
public or general interest in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), was shortlived.
Three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Rosenbloom rationale
was impliedly overruled.
155. The constitutional privilege in defamation cases was extended to public figures in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
156. Comment, Privacy: The Search For .4 Standard, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 659, 679
(1975). The author argues that the newsworthiness standard is appropriate for application to pri-
vacy cases as a result of its ability to put a person on notice that an event is of public interst. The
author continues:
[T]he contemporaneousness of the event as it affects public interest alerts the individual
that his privacy might be abridged. In other words, the more current an event is, the
greater the public interest. The private plaintiff is thereby put on notice of intrusion, and
"under some circumstances. . . an incident is so notorious that contemporaneous publi-
cation can hardly cause a further impairment of privacy."
Id.
In fact, it is true that the newsworthiness, or public interest, standard has been applied to
privacy cases. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445
F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1971); Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), ceri. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Fletcher v. Florida Pub-
lishing Co., 319 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975). It must, however, be borne in mind that the
Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide which of these standards is applicable.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Supreme Court reiterated its
holding in the Time case as to matters of public interest. The Court stated that
[W]here the interest at issue is privacy rather than reputation and the right claimed is to
be free from the publication of false or misleading information about one's affairs, the
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Supreme Court, in Cantrell v. Forest Ciy Publishing Co.,' 5 expressly
rejected the opportunity to decide whether the rule of Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc. ,15 applied to privacy cases.' 59
The application of the newsworthiness standard, as opposed to the
public figure rule, will result in a difference in the protection afforded
to the individual's privacy. The difference is in the analysis and will
have a direct bearing on whether the privacy plaintiff will be required
to prove actual malice.160 An event might be of public interest, but the
target of the publication must prove knowing or reckless falsehood where the materials
published, although assertedly private, are "matters of public interest."
.d. at 490. The Court, however, did not reach the constitutional privilege question. After stating
that the privacy cause of action involved was one of public disclosure, the Court narrowly framed
its scope of inquiry. The Court stated:
Rather than address the broader question whether truthful publications may ever be
subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, or to put it another way, whether the State may ever define and protect an area of
privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate to focus on the nar-
rower interface between press and privacy that this case presents, namely, whether the
State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim
obtained from public records-more specifically, from judicial records which are main-
tained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public
inspection. We are convinced that the State may not do so.
Id. at 491.
157. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
158. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz the Court held that that the Times standard applied to
defamation actions brought by public officials and figures but stated that the private individual
plaintiff would not be required to prove actual malice on the part of the defendant. The standard
as to private individuals would be set by the states as long as they did not impose liability without
fault. Id. at 347.
159. The Court stated that the Cantrell case presented no occasion to determine whether the
Gertz distinctions between public and private persons applied to privacy cases because no objec-
tion was made to the knowing-or-reckless falsehood instruction given to the jury. Cantrell v.
Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250 (1974).
As a result of the Court's reluctance in Cantrell, the status of both Hill and Gertz, in their
relation to privacy law, is in question. Consequently, the constitutional privilege in privacy cases
is also in doubt. The law is uncertain as to whether the privilege to speak relates to the event or to
the person. The problem lies not in the inherent confusion of the Gertz opinion, see Yasser,
Defamation As A Constitutional Tort: With Actual Malice For All, 12 Tulsa L.J. 601, 618-24
(1977), but rather in determining whether the Gertz standards apply at all in privacy cases. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652E, Comment d (1976), where the drafters state that the
effect of Gertz on the Hill decision is uncertain. The drafters point out that if the Hill case is
modified along the lines of Gertz, "then the reckless disregard rule will apparently apply if the
plaintiff is a public official or a public figure and the negligence rule will apply to other plaintiffs."
Id.
160. In Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979), the Supreme Court was required to decide the
extent to which a defamation plaintiff might inquire into the state of mind accompanying the
editorial process. The Court stated that "New York Times and its progeny made it essential to
proving liability that plaintiffs focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defendant." Id. at
1641.
The court buttressed its conclusion by noting that evidence dealing with the editorial process
has been continually accepted without constitutional objection. After citing forty-one cases in
support of this proposition, the Court stated that none of them "as much as suggested that there
were special limits applicable to the press on the discoverability of such evidence, either before or
22
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individual around whom it centers might still be considered a private
individual.16  To first look to the event, therefore, for the purpose of
determining whether the constitutional privilege exists, is to possibly
deprive a person of her status as a private individual.
62
In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 163 the Court gave some indica-
tion that the Gertz rule, rather than the newsworthiness standard,
would apply to privacy cases by stating that "[a] libel defendant must
show more than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the de-
manding burden of New York Times."'" Although the Wolston case
arose in the context of a libel suit, the principle appears to be consistent
with the Cantrell privacy decision in which the Court was apparently
unconcerned with the newsworthy nature of the Cantrell facts. Thus, it
appears that the general repudiation of the newsworthiness standard as
it relates to defamation causes of action will carry over into the law of
privacy.
It appears, therefore, that one major difference between the public
figure and newsworthiness standards is that in the former, analysis is to
be concentrated on the plaintiff's activity while in the latter, the plain-
tiff's voluntary conduct may have no bearing on the issue of new-
sworthiness. 65  The newsworthiness standard and analysis of the
during trial." Id. at 1644 n.15. Compare Note, Defamation and the First Amendment: Editorial
Process Found "Privileged" in Herbert v. Lando, 13 TULSA L.J. 837 (1978).
161. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
Inc., 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979). These cases pertained to situations in which the plaintiffs were in-
volved in newsworthy events. Each plaintiff had been the subject of newspaper articles. In both
cases, however, the Court held that the plaintiffs had not acheived public figure status. Thus,
neither was required to prove actual malice on the defendant's part.
162. The reason that the individual's status should be the primary consideration arises from
the fact that, as earlier stated, the Times standard is fully applicable to invasion of privacy cases.
In the recent case of Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979), the United
States Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff was not a public figure. The facts were that the
plaintiff had been listed as a Soviet agent in a book entitled KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet
Agents. His failure to appear at a grand jury investigation as a result of health problems resulted
in a contempt citation followed by a suspended sentence of one year. Although the incidents
surrounding the court proceedings received great publicity, the Court concluded that the plaintiff
was not a public figure merely as a result of his failure to appear at a federal grand jury investiga-
tion of Soviet activities. The Court stated the plaintiff had been "dragged unwillingly into the
controversy," id. at 2707, thus holding that the plaintiff had retained his status as a private indi-
vidual.
163. Id. at 2701.
164. Id. at 2708.
165. Thus, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979), a case decided the same day as
Woston, the Court stated that "those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct,
create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure." Id. at 2688. Hutchinson, a
research scientist, was the recipient of Senator William Proxmire's "Golden Fleece of the Month"
award as an example of wasteful government spending. After concluding that Senator Proxmire's
publication of libelous statements was not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court
1979]
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constitutional privilege, as it relates to privacy actions, results in re-
moving from many plaintiffs their right to undisturbed privacy. It per-
mits the disturbance of the right if only for the reason that an
individual became involved in a topic of public concern through no
voluntary, concerted action of her own. 166
At least one court 67 has gone so far as to predict that the Gertz
rule will eventually be applied to privacy causes of action. In Rinsley v.
Brandt16 8 the court stated that judicial focus t 69 must be directed at the
plaintiff's "status and not upon the public interest in determining
whether the plaintiff must demonstrate malice in order to recover upon
his invasion of privacy claim."' 70 Despite general application of the
newsworthiness standard 7' to determine the applicability of the consti-
tutional privilege in privacy cases, it seems fairly safe to assume that
the Court, when confronted with a privacy claim involving the public
figure and corresponding constitutional privilege issues, will apply the
Gertz rule.' 72 This assumption is based on the similarity between the
laws of privacy and defamation,173 judicial desire to give full redress to
an infringement of an individual's right to privacy, and the fact that the
held that the plaintiff was not a public figure. The Court stated that Hutchinson had not assumed
a role of public prominence and that the defendant did not identify a controversy, but merely a
"concern about general public expenditures." Id.
166. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
167. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977).
168. Id.
169. It has been held that "it is for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether the
proofs show [plaintiff]I to be a 'public official."' Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 104 1,
1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966)).
In Hotchner the court concluded that the author of a "best-seller" was a public figure. The
court focused on the individual even though his book, arguably the event, was of public interest or
newsworthy.
170. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 856 (D. Kan. 1977). The Cantrell decision is appar-
ently what led the court to declare that the Gertz rule as to status would come to control over any
concern as to the matter being of public interest. Although the Court was not required to decide
the applicability of Gertz to the Cantrell fact situation, it was seemingly unconcerned with the
newsworthiness of the collapse of the bridge in which Mr. Cantrell had been killed.
The dissenting opinion in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224,
351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977), would have applied the Gertz
rule rather than the pubic interest standard. The dissenting judge stated that "the majority opin-
ion conceivably errs by characterizing the standard to be used, in the first instance, as 'whether the
matters reported were of public interest,' as that standard was rejected in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. . . ." 47 Ohio St. 2d at _, 351 N.E.2d at 364. In reversing the Ohio Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court stated that the Zacehini case involved the right of publicity rather
than the right to privacy. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
171. See note 156 supra.
172. The drafters of the Restatement hint that the Gertz rule will eventually replace the public
interest standard. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, Comment d (1976).
173. See notes 27-28, 97-109, 133-166 supra and accompanying text.
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right to privacy deserves the full protection of the Constitution. 74
As is evident from the preceding discussions, the state of the law
concerning false light privacy is uncertain. Two alternatives are offered
for the purpose of remedying this confusion. The first is closely related
to the interest that should be protected by the false light tort. It sug-
gests that the tort be realigned so as to fully protect a plaintiff's mental
interest by making the tort consistent with the concept underlying the
law of privacy. The second, and more drastic of the two alternatives,
relates to the elements of the false light cause of action and suggests
that the tort be abandoned due to an inherent conflict between the con-
cept of privacy and the requirement of a false statement.
B. The First Alternative: Retention of the False Light Tort
Examination of the interests and elements of the false light tort
indicates that there are both similarities and differences between it and
defamation. Despite these similarities and differences, the courts must
ensure that the two areas of the law remain separate and distinct from
each other. As stated earlier, there is little doubt that both the right to
privacy and the false light cause of action have become firmly estab-
lished in the law. The first alternative relates closely to the interest
purportedly protected by the false light tort. It calls for a restructuring
of the tort so as to fully protect a plaintiff's interest in her mental tran-
quility. Invasion of privacy is based upon injury to an individual's
emotions and her mental suffering while defamation is a remedy for
injury to a plaintiff's reputation.
Privacy law is not identical to defamation and should be used
neither to engulf it 7 5 nor duplicate its remedy. The concept and theory
of privacy law'76 does not and should not allow compensation for dam-
age to an individual's reputation. Under the retention alternative, a
plaintiff who is placed in a false light should, however, be permitted to
recover for the mental anguish suffered as a result of the publicized
falsehood. Recovery should never be granted, however, on the basis of
any damage to reputation that results from being placed in a false light.
A failure to protect a plaintiff's mental interest and a lack of concern
for her interest in remaining free from unwanted interference with her
personal affairs has moved the false light tort beyond the realm of pri-
174. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 198, _. 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905).
175. Contra Wade, Defamation andthe Right Of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1124 (1962).
176. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
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vacy law. Privacy law should compensate only for serious mental
anguish 177 suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct.
It should be noted that although the Restatement formulation of
the false light tort rests on the falsity of the statement, 178 it is, if the tort
is to be retained, probably the best formulation yet to be followed by
the courts. The Restatement formulation seeks to protect a mental in-
terest by allowing recovery only in those instances in which the false
light "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."' 179 It is true
that an individual has an interest "in not being made to appear before
the public . . . otherwise than as he is."' 0 It must be remembered,
however, that the false light tort is a privacy action and not an action
for defamation. An inconsistency arises, therefore, between the lan-
guage of comment "b" to section 652E and the section itself in that the
comment would protect reputation while the language of the section
would protect only a plaintiff's mental interest. The comment is also
inconsistent with the concept of privacy and should not, therefore, be
used by the courts as a guidepost to the law of false light privacy.
In light of the foregoing, the false light tort should be restructured
so as to give compensation to plaintiffs who, as a result of an erroneous
depiction to the public,'' have suffered serious mental distress. No
compensation should be granted under a false light theory for any
damage to a plaintiff's reputation. The scope of the protection af-
forded by privacy law should be limited to its intended, obvious, and
conceptual basis.
It appears, then, that a plaintiff should be permitted to recover to
the full extent of her mental injury under a false light cause of action in
those instances in which the falsehood does not rise to the level of being
defamatory. If, however, a plaintiff is able to mount a successful defa-
mation action, then she should be permitted to recover for the injury to
her reputation. Of course any mental suffering endured by the plaintiff
would be compensated as incidental damages in the defamation ac-
tion.8 2 Thus, the false light tort should be accepted by the courts as
being a remedy for mental suffering and not as a remedy to compensate
for injury to reputation. If the false light cause of action is to be re-
177. See notes 25-89 supra and accompanying text.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
179. Id.
180. Id. at Comment b.
181. See notes 97-119 supra and accompanying text.
182. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs (4th ed. 1971).
[Vol. 15:113
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tained, it should be limited to its conceptual basis as found in section
652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.1 3
C. The Second Alternative. Abolition of the False Light Cause of
Action
It is clear that a material element of a false light cause of action is
that a false statement be made about the plaintiff. As earlier stated, an
inconsistency arises between falsity and the concept of privacy. This
inconsistency is illustrated by the fact that an individual cannot intend
to keep private that which is false.
It is because of this inherent inconsistency that the second alterna-
tive of abandoning the false light cause of action is advocated. 8 4 A
matter cannot be both false and private at the same time. The inconsis-
tency, coupled with the fact that the concept of privacy should be a
necessary factor in all false light privacy actions, leads to the conclusion
that the false light cause of action should be removed from the law of
privacy. Moreover, the inconsistency has permitted the law of privacy
to be expanded beyond its logical limits in that the concept of privacy
has been removed from a false light privacy action.
The requirement of a false statement has resulted in additional
confusion by bringing false light causes of action into closer relation
with defamation actions. A false statement is the basis of both causes
of action. Inasmuch as false statements should occupy no place in the
law of privacy, this requirement has moved the law of privacy beyond
its logical limits.
V. CONCLUSION
Dean Prosser's article entitled Privacy, giving birth to a new analy-
sis of the law of privacy, is the modern equivalent of the Warren and
Brandeis article giving rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
Prosser argues that much of the confusion in the law is a result of the
failure to separate the four torts he has identified. Yet it is the false
light tort that has, in fact, caused the confusion. Privacy law was not
intended to protect a person's reputation. Nor was it designed to deal
183. Compare notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
184. As a practical matter, it is not likely that this alternative will be accepted by the courts. In
view of the fact that the false light cause of action is firmly established, this alternative is an
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specifically with false statements. Courts and writers cannot ignore the
underlying principle of the law of privacy. That foundation is the indi-
vidual's right to be free from public scrutiny of those facets of her life
that she would prefer to keep private.
In order to properly conform the law of privacy to its conceptual
basis, the courts must either realign the false light tort so as to protect
an individual's mental interest by granting redress on that basis when
the plaintiff has been placed in a false light, or they must undertake to
abandon the false light tort on the ground that a false statement cannot
be an invasion of an individual's privacy. Regardless of which course
the judiciary deems most appropriate, an effort must be made to clarify
the tort so as to allow consistency of application.
Bruce A. McKenna
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